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1 Introduction
Will a bankruptcy system that automatically puts bankrupt firms up for auction produce fire-
sales? While direct evidence on this issue is sparse, legal and financial scholars have expressed
skepticism towards the workings of automatic bankruptcy auctions. For example, the perceived risk
of auction fire-sales helped motivate the 1978 U.S. bankruptcy reform introducing court-supervised
debt renegotiations under Chapter 11. Provisions for court-supervised reorganization were also
adopted in several member states of the European Union in the 1990s. Observing the reform process
in Europe, Hart (2000) comments that “I’m not aware of any group–management, shareholders,
creditors, or workers–who is pushing for cash auctions.” The auction mechanism is unpopular in
large part due to widespead—but largely untested—concerns with illiquidity and fire-sales.1
Since a debt renegotiation system such as Chapter 11 involves costs of its own, the comparative
efficiency of automatic auctions is an empirical issue.2 Interestingly, there is growing use of rela-
tively low-cost, market-based mechanisms to resolve bankruptcy in the U.S., indicating substantial
concern with traditional Chapter 11 proceedings. These include “prepackaged” bankruptcies with a
reorganization plan in place at filing (Betker, 1995; Lease, McConnell, and Tashjian, 1996), acquisi-
tion of distressed debt by “vulture” investors in order to make voting more efficient (Hotchkiss and
Mooradian, 1997), and voluntary sales in Chapter 11 (Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998; Maksimovic
and Phillips, 1998). Baird and Rasmussen (2003) report that more than half of all large Chapter
11 cases resolved in 2002 used the auction mechanism in one form or another, and that another
quarter were prepacks.
This paper presents the first comprehensive empirical analysis of the tendency for automatic
bankruptcy auctions to induce fire-sale discounts in prices and debt recovery rates. We study
bankruptcies in Sweden, where filing firms are automatically turned over to a court-appointed
trustee who organizes an open, cash-only auction. All targets are subject to a single uniform
selling mechanism (open, first-price auction), and the bids alone determine the auction outcome
1Shleifer and Vishny (1992) formalize this concern in a model of industry illiquidity and conclude that, “We agree
with Easterbrook (1990) that the policy of automatic auctions for the assets of distressed firms, without the possibility
of Chapter 11 protection, is not theoretically sound.” (p.1344)
2The literature on Chapter 11 points to costs associated with conflicts of interests and excessive continuation
resulting from managerial control over the restructuring process. For early warnings of agency problems in Chapter
11, see, e.g., Baird (1986), Bebchuk (1988), Jensen (1989), Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992), Bebchuk and Chang
(1992), Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992), and Baird (1993).
1
(continuation sale or piecemeal liquidation). As a result, the cross-sectional variation in auction
prices is determined largely by demand-side conditions, which is ideal for the identification of fire-
sale discounts. Our sample of 258 bankrupt firms are all private (bankruptcies among publicly
traded Swedish firms were rare over the sample period), and the average pre-filing sales is about
$8 million (2007 dollars). This is similar to the average sales for firms filing for Chapter 11 (Chang
and Schoar, 2007).
A fire-sale discount results when the observed auction price is lower than an estimate of the
assets’ fundamental value (taken to represent the value in best alternative use). The literature
highlights temporary demand-side conditions that may give rise to such a discount. For example,
since financial distress tends to be contagious within an industry (Lang and Stulz, 1992), high-
valuation industry rivals may themselves be financially constrained and unable to bid in the auction
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Aghion, Hart, and Moore, 1992). Industry debt overhang may also
attenuate industry rivals’ incentive to invest in the bankrupt firm (Myers, 1977; Clayton and Ravid,
2002). As industry rivals are unwilling to bid, the risk increases that relatively low-valuation
industry outsiders win the auction—at fire-sale prices. The chance of this happening is greater for
unique or specific assets with few potential buyers (Williamson, 1988).
Several U.S. studies present evidence on fire-sale discounts in voluntary asset sales, both in and
out of Chapter 11. For example, Pulvino (1998, 1999) provides evidence of fire-sale discounts for the
sale of individual aircrafts. Ramey and Shapiro (2001) and Officer (2007) study liquidity discounts
associated with distressed plant closings and corporate targets outside of bankruptcy, and Acharya,
Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) examine recovery rates for U.S. firms defaulting on their debt. Our
empirical setting differs fundamentally from these studies in that we examine mandatory auctions
of entire bankrupt firms.
Much is known about the workings of the Swedish auction bankruptcy system. Thorburn (2000)
presents evidence that the auctions are speedy (lasting on average two months) and have low direct
bankruptcy costs. Moreover, she finds that recovery rates are similar to those reported by Franks
and Torous (1994) for a sample of Chapter 11 cases with market value data for the new debt
securities. She also reports that direct bankruptcy costs are lowest for bankruptcy filings where
the target has privately worked out an acquisition agreement just prior to filing. These “auction
prepacks” play an important role in the empirical analysis below. Eckbo and Thorburn (2003)
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show substantial CEO turnover and wealth decline following bankruptcy filing, and find that firms
sold as going-concern typically perform at par with industry rivals. Eckbo and Thorburn (2008)
find that the bankrupt firm’s main creditor (always a bank) actively promotes auction liquidity by
financing a bidder. The bank also has an incentive to use bid financing to engineer greater auction
premiums (and therefore higher debt recovery rates), which the evidence supports.
Strömberg (2000) develops and tests a model for the decision of the previous owner to repurchase
the bankrupt firm (a saleback). He finds that salebacks are more likely to occur when industry
financial distress is high, and conjectures that salebacks help preempt excessive liquidation. The
auction price data presented below (not available in Strömberg’s analysis) directly addresses this
conjecture. If the transacting parties view piecemeal liquidation as the relevant alternative to a
saleback, prices will on average be lower in salebacks than in non-saleback going-concern sales.
Instead, we show that prices in these two categories of going-concern sales are indistinguishable.
There is no evidence that saleback prices resemble those in piecemeal liquidations. Instead, we find
significant average price discounts in auction prepacks relative to other going-concern sales, which
is consistent with liquidation preemption.
Since severe economic decline causes firms to exit their industries at low prices (efficient liqui-
dation), studies of fire-sale discounts face a fundamental identification problem: is a given low sales
price due to temporary financial- or permanent economic distress? Similar to Pulvino (1998), we
deal with this problem by estimating a cross-sectional model for the asset’s fundamental value. This
value estimate accounts for the tendency for firms that are liquidated piecemeal to have significantly
lower economic value than firms that are acquired as going concerns. We then compute the differ-
ence between actual and model prices, also referred to as the “price residual.” A fire-sale discount
is said to exist if the price residual is adversely affected by measures of industry-wide illiquidity
and financial distress. Since this fire-sale test is joint with the fundamental value model, we check
for robustness to alternative model specifications, including a model that allows for endogenous
selection of the going-concern versus piecemeal liquidation outcomes.
The main empirical results are as follows. First, there is evidence of conditional fire-sale dis-
counts in auctions that lead to piecemeal liquidation. This conclusion holds for both auction prices
and debt recovery rates, and it is robust to a model that allows the liquidation outcome to be
endogenously specified. A 1% increase in industry distress reduces piecemeal liquidation prices by
3
2%. The probability of piecemeal liquidation is higher for targets with relatively tangible assets,
and higher when industry-wide leverage ratios are high and the business cycle is in a downturn.
Thus, industry-wide distress appears to simultaneously increase the odds of a piecemeal liquidation
and reduce piecemeal liquidation prices, as predicted by the fire-sale hypothesis.
Second, price- and recovery rate residuals in going-concern sales are unaffected by industry
distress, and there is no evidence of lower prices when the buyer is an industry outsider. This
important conclusion holds for salebacks as well, suggesting there is little scope for bypassing the
discipline of the auction mechanism even if the buyer is the former target owner. The typical going-
concern auction attracts five interested bidders and three actual bids, which appears sufficient to
counter potential fire-sale tendencies.
Third, we observe that buyers in going-concern sales frequently structure the acquisition as
a leveraged buyout as opposed to a merger. In a merger, the buyer finances the auction cash
payment using retained earnings and the proceeds from securities issued on the acquiring firm.
Thus, a merger requires internal financial slack. In a buyout, however, the target assets are placed
in a new company, and the cash payment is raised by issuing securities directly on this buyout firm.
The latter method is equivalent to the “project financing” method, which Myers (1977) shows will
resolve the underinvestment problem caused by debt overhang. We find that bidders employ the
buyout mechanism to the point where price- and recovery rate residuals in buyouts and mergers
are statistically indistinguishable and independent of industry-wide distress. This suggests that the
buyout method increases liquidity and promotes auction competition in continuation sales.
Fourth, facing the prospect of fire-sale discounts in liquidations, we hypothesize that the main
creditor (the bank) counters excessive liquidation by promoting a pre-filing private workout (in the
form of a sales proposal). As indicated above, prices in prepacks are significantly lower than prices
in regular going-concern sales, which is consistent with the liquidation preemption hypothesis.
Interestingly, despite the lower prepack prices, the bank’s own recovery rate is no lower in prepacks
than in regular going-concern auctions. It appears that the bank strategically promotes a prepack
agreement when it is in its interest to do so.
Finally, we ask whether the target firms that are continued via prepacks, or are purchased by
industry outsiders, are operated less efficiently than other going-concern sales. If prepacks represent
attempts to avoid excessive liquidation, the target assets may be in relatively bad shape and difficult
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to restructure as a going-concern. We find the post-bankruptcy operating performance of prepack
targets and targets of industry outsiders to be at par with industry rivals. However, the probability
of bankruptcy refiling over the two years following the auction is significantly greater for prepacks,
suggesting that liquidation preemption is a risky strategy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides sample information and key auction
characteristics. Section 3 presents our cross-sectional evidence on the existence of a fire-sale discount
for the total sample. Section 4 focuses on potential price impacts of industry distress in auction
prepacks and salebacks. Section 5 produces evidence on post-bankruptcy operating performance
and bankruptcy refiling rates, while Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Auction data and characteristics
2.1 The auction bankruptcy system
A Swedish firm may enter bankruptcy if it is insolvent.3 Upon bankruptcy filing, control of the firm
is transferred to an independent, court-appointed trustee with fiduciary responsibility to creditors.
The trustee’s main task is to organize the sale of the firm in an open, cash-only auction. Trustees
are certified and supervised by a government agency (“Tillsynsmyndigheten i Konkurs”), which
reviews the trustees’ compensation and ability to hold a proper arms-length auction. The filing
triggers an automatic stay of debt payments and prevents repossession of collateral. The firm’s
employees, including the management team, run the firm until it is auctioned off. Expenses incurred
while operating in bankruptcy are paid as you go, effectively granting such expenses super-priority.4
The bids in the auction determine whether the firm will be liquidated piecemeal or continued
as a restructured going concern. As indicated above, a going-concern sale takes place by merger,
where the target is fused with the operations of the acquiring firm, or through a buyout, where the
target assets are placed in an empty company set up by the buyer. In either case, the target’s assets
3If the firm files the petition, insolvency is presumed and the filing approved automatically. If a creditor files,
insolvency must be proven, a process that takes on average two months. In our sample, about 90% of the filings are
debtor-initiated.
4The trustee may raise super-priority debt to finance the firm’s activities until the final sale. Since the auctions
are speedy there is little demand for such financing. There is a government wage guarantee applicable to unpaid
wages for up to six months prior to bankruptcy filing, as well as up to six months following filing depending on the
employee’s tenure with the firm. During our sample period, the maximum guarantee was approximately $55,000 per
employee.
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are transferred to the buying company while the debt claims remain on the books of the bankrupt
firm. The cash auction proceeds are distributed to creditors strictly according to absolute priority.
A prepackaged bankruptcy filing is subject to approval by secured creditors. Since the firm
remains insolvent following the prepack sale—the cash proceeds from the sale are necessarily less
than the face value of debt—it must file for bankruptcy. In a prepack filing, the trustee checks for
conflicts of interest in the proposed asset sale. If the sale is overturned, the contract is voided and
the trustee continues with the auction (where the prepack bidder may participate). In practice,
prepack filings are almost never overturned (Thorburn, 2000).
The Swedish bankruptcy code also has provisions for renegotiating unsecured debt claims (so-
called composition). A composition must offer full repayment of secured debt and priority claims
(taxes, wages, etc.) and at least 25% of unsecured creditors’ claims. In practice, composition is
rare as the priority claims tend to be highly impaired in bankruptcy.
2.2 Sample characteristics
We start with the sample information on 263 bankruptcies compiled by Strömberg and Thorburn
(1996) and Thorburn (2000). This sample originates from a population of 1,159 Swedish firms with
at least 20 employees that filed for bankruptcy over the period January 1988 through December
1991. We expand the original data to include firm- and auction characteristics required for our
fire-sale hypotheses. Of the 263 original auctions, three are excluded because the final outcome
cannot be unambiguously classified as a going-concern sale or a piecemeal liquidation, and another
two auctions are dropped due to lack of target financial data. Thus, our final sample contains 258
bankruptcy auctions. Of the 258 targets, 31% are manufacturing companies, 33% are wholesale
and retail companies, 14% are construction companies, 11% are in the transportation industry, and
another 11% are hotels and restaurants.
Table 1 lists asset characteristics of the target firms, industry liquidity conditions, and auc-
tion outcome variables. Target asset characteristics and industry liquidity conditions combine to
determine bidder demand and thus the auction outcome. As discussed below, we use the asset char-
acteristics to model the target’s fundamental value, and industry characteristics largely to examine
the sensitivity of auction prices to fire-sale conditions.
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2.2.1 Target asset characteristics
The literature on asset sales shows that distressed firms prefer to sell off relatively tangible, less
productive (non-core) assets when raising cash to stave off bankruptcy.5 This means that, at the
time of the bankruptcy filing, some targets will have a high proportion of intangible and illiquid
assets. Highly specialized assets require unique managerial skills and have limited redeployment
options, affecting both the fundamental value and the type of bidder that is likely to submit a
continuation bid in the auction. To capture these effects, we employ five proxies for the state
of the target assets, listed in Panel A of Table 1. The first is the pre-filing target book value,
Size, defined as the logarithm of the book value of the target firm’s assets as reported in the last
financial statement prior to bankruptcy filing.6 The bankrupt firms, which are all privately held,
are typically small with an average book value of assets of $2.3 million.7
Extensive pre-filing asset sales and general revenue decline cause Size to overstate the actual
size of the bankrupt firm at the time of filing. In fact, total proceeds from the bankruptcy sale
average only half of the pre-filing book-asset size. To capture some of the cross-sectional variation in
the size reduction caused by pre-filing asset sales, we include the binary variable Asset sales. This
variable, which is constructed from information in the bankruptcy trustee’s report, takes a value of
one if the report indicates significant pre-filing asset sales, and zero otherwise. Overall, larger firms
and targets with more of its original assets intact are expected to generate higher auction prices.
We also include three proxies for the quality of the target assets. The first is the pre-filing
operating profitability (Profit) defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amor-
tization (EBITDA) divided by sales, as reported in the last financial statement. Moreover, as
Strömberg (2000), we capture asset uniqueness with the variable Specific, defined as book value of
machinery and equipment over total assets (from the last financial statement). Third, the variable
Intangible, defined as the fraction of total debt at filing that is unsecured, is used as a proxy for
asset intangibility in the absence of market value data for our private firms. We expect the three
proxies for asset quality to affect auction prices as well as the probability that the target will be
5See, e.g., Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1992), Ofek (1993), John and Ofek (1995), Kim (1998), and Maksi-
movic and Phillips (2001).
6The time from the last financial statement to the bankruptcy filing date is on average 16 months.
7As is common for small firms, ownership concentration is high. The average CEO owns 60% of the equity (Eckbo
and Thorburn, 2003).
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sold as a going concern.
2.2.2 Industry liquidity conditions
Under the fire-sale hypothesis, industry liquidity affects bidder demand in the auction and hence
the final auction price. Tests of the fire-sales hypothesis therefore amount to examining whether
sales prices are correlated with measures of industry liquidity and distress. Our analysis uses the
four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code for the target firms’ industry. Industry
benchmarks are created for each target firm using financial information for the Swedish population
of 16,000 firms with at least 20 employees provided by Upplysnings Centralen AB.
We use five proxies for industry conditions, listed in Panel B of Table 1. All industry information
is measured in the year of the bankruptcy filing. Of the five variables, industry profitability and
business cycle change are used to estimate the fundamental value of the target. Industry operating
profitability, Ind Profits, is defined as EBITDA/sales of the median industry firm. The variable
Bus Cycle measures the most recent change in the quarterly value of a composite business cycle
index. The index components include gross national product (entering the index with a positive
sign), producer prices (+), aggregate consumption (+), unemployment rate (-), and the aggregate
number of corporate bankruptcy filings (-).8
The remaining three proxies are used to capture effects of industry financial distress on auction
demand. We measure industry distress, Ind Distress, as the fraction of industry firms that file for
bankruptcy the following year or has an interest coverage ratio (the ratio of EBITDA and interest
income to total interest expense) less than one. On average, one-third of the industry rivals are
classified as financially distressed in this sense. We measure industry leverage, Ind Leverage, using
the median firm leverage (book value of debt over total assets) in the industry. The average industry
leverage ratio is high: 0.78 for the overall sample. Finally, we include the number of firms in the
four-digit target industry, No of firms, as an indicator of potential demand for the target assets
in the auction. As shown in Table 1, the average industry consists of 267 rivals.
8This data is from Statistics Sweden. The components are normalized with their respective mean and standard
deviation and enter the index with equal weight.
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2.2.3 Auction outcomes
Panel C of Table 1 shows six binary variables representing different auction outcomes. These
outcomes indicate the nature of the asset restructuring (going-concern sale GC versus piecemeal
liquidation PL of the target), whether the buyer is an industry outsider (Outsider), whether the
buyer uses the buyout acquisition method (Buyout), whether a bidder was identified prior to filing
and the filing came with a prepackaged takeover agreement (Prepack), and whether the buyer
is a former owner of the target (Saleback). Finally, Panel C lists the total debt recovery rate
(Recovery).
As shown in the top line of Table 1, of the 258 auctions, 200 targets are sold as going concerns,
while 58 targets are liquidated piecemeal. The corresponding sample proportions (0.78 and 0.22)
are shown in Panel C, using the indicator variables GC and PL. The variable Prepack shows that
27% or 53 of the 200 going-concern auctions are prepack filings.9 The bankruptcy files contain
information on prior links between the buyer and the bankrupt firm. Using this information,
63% or 122 of 193 going-concern sales are identified as salebacks to a former owner of the target
firm. A total of 32 cases are both a prepack and a saleback, an interesting subsample which we
examine in some detail below. The overall saleback propensity is similar across prepacks and regular
bankruptcy filings.
We follow Strömberg (2000) and classify a buyer as an industry outsider if the buyer (i) is
neither a former owner or employee of the target, and (ii) does not have the same three-digit SIC
code as the target, and is not otherwise identified as a direct target competitor. Strömberg also
classifies piecemeal liquidations as sales to outsiders. However, we restrict the outsider indicator
variable to going-concern sales, because the identity of the buyer is rarely identifiable from the
bankruptcy file when the auction results in piecemeal liquidation. As shown in Panel C, Outsider
has an average value of 0.26, indicating that 26% of the going-concern sales result in sales to an
industry outsider.10 It is reasonable to expect target industry insiders to have an advantage over
industry outsiders in terms of their ability to create synergy gains from the takeover.
For 146 of the 200 continuation sales, we are able to classify the acquisition method as either
9While not shown in Table 1, in prepacks the median CEO owns 100% of the equity, possibly because prepacks
require a voluntary coordination among the distressed firm’s claimholders.
10While not shown in the table, the buyer is an industry outsider in 19 or 36% of the prepacks, indicating that a
prepack often involves a wide search for a buyer prior to filing.
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merger or buyout. As shown in Panel C, a majority (71%) are buyouts. Buyouts occur in 74% of
non-prepack going-concern sales and in 64% of prepacks (not shown in Table 1). In the remaining
cases the target firm is merged into the pre-existing bidder company. Saleback transactions occur
in 55% of the mergers and 66% of the buyouts.
The debt recovery rate is defined as net auction revenue divided by total face value of debt.
Note that, since auction revenue is determined in an open auction and paid in cash, this recovery
rate is effectively measured using market values. The recovery rate averages 37% in going-concern
sales and 26% in piecemeal liquidations.
2.2.4 Bidder competition
We obtain bid information from the auction files and through direct communication with auction
trustees. In addition to maintaining a record of the actual bids, the trustees keep track of parties
expressing a serious interest in participating in the auction. Some of the interested bidders proceed
with a formal offer, while others are deterred by competition and never move beyond the expression
of interest. The existence of a pool of interested bidders is interesting as it indicates the level of
potential competition in the auction.
We have information on bidder interest in 102 of the 147 non-prepack going-concern sales.
We do not track bid frequencies in prepacks nor in piecemeal liquidations since these are largely
missing. In piecemeal liquidations, the number of bidders depends arbitrarily on the number of
assets sold. In auction prepacks, the bid data are incomplete since the trustee approves the firm’s
sales agreement after the prepack buyer has been selected. Tracking a subsample of 33 prepacks
with bid data, we find direct evidence of bid competition in only five (15%) of the cases.
Fig. 1 shows the frequency distribution of actual and interested bidders across the subsample
of non-prepack continuation sales. The number of actual bids ranges from one to 22, with a mean
of 3.5. The number of interested bidders (which includes the actual bids) ranges from one to 40,
with an average of 5.5 (median 3.0). There are multiple actual bids in a majority (63%) of the
going-concern auctions. The bid frequency reported here for automatic bankruptcy auctions is
somewhat higher than the number of bids per target in U.S. tender offers found by Betton and
Eckbo (2000), and the number of bidders involved in pre-merger talks with targets found by Boone
and Mulherin (2007). In sum, our auctions attract substantial bidder competition.
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3 Do auction fire-sales exist?
3.1 The fire-sale hypothesis and two-step test approach
In this section, we test for the existence of fire-sale discounts in auction prices and debt recovery
rates. As stated in the introduction, industry distress may temporarily reduce auction demand and
lower auction proceeds. Severe liquidity constraints could also result in the winning bidder being
a relatively inefficient industry outsider. Let P denote the total proceeds from the auction. The
analysis is carried out using auction prices p in logarithmic form, so p ≡ ln(P ). Total debt recovery
rate is defined as r ≡ (P − C)/D, where C is direct bankruptcy costs and D is the face value of
the target’s total debt. The following hypothesis summarizes our key predictions:
H1 (Fire-sale hypothesis): Fire-sale discounts in auction prices and debt recovery
rates increase with industry-wide financial distress, and are greater when the winning
bidder is an industry outsider.
We follow Pulvino (1998) and use a two-step procedure to test the fire-sale hypothesis. The
first step identifies the fundamental values (absent industry liquidity constraints) by regressing p
and r on a vector X1 of target asset quality factors as follows:
p = β′1pX1 + ε1p
r = β′1rX1 + ε1r, (1)
where ε1p and ε1r are first-step error terms assumed iid with mean zero. The fundamental prices
and recovery rates are defined as the predicted values p∗ ≡ β̂′1pX1 and r∗ ≡ β̂′1rX1, where the hat
indicates ordinary least square (OLS) estimate. In the second step, the residuals p− p∗ and r− r∗
from the first step are standardized with the regression standard error and regressed on a vector
X2 containing proxies for fire-sale conditions:
p− p∗ = β′2pX2 + ε2p
r − r∗ = β′2rX2 + ε2r. (2)
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The second-step error terms ε2p and ε2r are assumed iid with mean zero. The vectors X1 and X2
are non-overlapping (except for PL, see below). We then use the OLS parameter estimates β̂2p
and β̂2r to test whether the fire-sale factors in X2 drive the final auction prices and recovery rates
below their estimated fundamental values.
This two-step approach allows us to use the full sample in the first regression, while the sec-
ond step may be restricted to subsamples. Also, since the two-step approach fixes the estimated
coefficients β̂1 from the first step in the second-step regression, it highlights the first-step as a
fundamental pricing model. Moreover, it allows easy interpretation of the second-step coefficients
as the marginal impact of industry liquidity conditions.
As a robustness test, we also report results for a single-equation estimation to allow a direct
comparison with the two-step approach. Moreover, we implement a procedure to control for poten-
tial self-selection bias in OLS estimates given that bidders’ choice between going-concern sale and
piecemeal liquidation is endogenous. The results of the self-selection procedure indicate that OLS
estimates are consistent, hence we report OLS estimates unless otherwise indicated.
3.2 The fundamental pricing model
Table 2 shows the results of the first-step regressions for p∗ and r∗ using the full sample of 258
auctions. The explanatory variables X1 include a constant plus the following three groups of
fundamental target valuation characteristics:
X1

Target assets : Size, Asset sales, Profit, Specific, Intangible
Industry conditions : Ind Profits, Bus Cycle
Auction outcome : GC, PL.
(3)
All variables are as defined in Table 1. We argue that asset specificity and intangibility affect the
value of the target as a going concern, regardless of industry liquidity conditions. Moreover, the
fundamental target value is hypothesized to depend on contemporaneous industry profitability and
the most recent quarterly change in the business cycle index.
Twenty-two percent of our targets end up being liquidated piecemeal, and it is imperative not
to confound the absence of a going-concern premium in liquidations with a fire-sale discount. The
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typical going-concern premium in our data is 125% measured relative to a professional estimate of
the piecemeal liquidation value made public by the trustee at the beginning of the auction. Our
targets have similar book asset sizes one year prior to bankruptcy filing, so book asset size is not
a predictor of the piecemeal liquidation outcome.
Since piecemeal liquidation occurs only when no bidder values the target as a going concern,
the ex post liquidation outcome is a proxy for the lower fundamental bidder valuations ex ante.
Consistent with this view, the average realized piecemeal liquidation price exceeds the trustee’s
piecemeal liquidation value estimate by only 8%. Moreover, whenever an auction leads to piece-
meal liquidation, we observe no going-concern bids for the target—as if the liquidation outcome is
apparent to all bidders.11 We therefore include the indicator PL in the fundamental pricing model.
The regression models in Table 2 are all statistically significant with R2 of 0.50 for the two
auction price regressions. The regressions in Panel A show that the final auction price increases in
Size and falls with Asset sales, as expected. Auction prices decrease in Intangible, which suggests
that bankruptcy is more costly for firms with a high proportion of intangible assets, as predicted
by, e.g., Williamson (1988). Auction prices are significantly lower in piecemeal liquidations.
We run separate regressions to test which variables in X1 have coefficients that are significantly
different across the outcomes PL and GC. The variable Specific is the only one to pass this test
and is therefore entered with separate coefficients for the two auction outcomes.12 The interaction
variable Specific∗GC has a significantly negative coefficient while Specific∗PL receives a positive
coefficient. There is no significant impact on the final auction price of the pre-filing target profits,
the contemporaneous industry profits, or business cycle change. Given the insignificance of the two
industry conditions for the target fundamental value, we use the first regressions in Panel A as our
model for the fundamental price p∗.
Turning to the two debt recovery rate regressions in Panel B of Table 2, the regressions have
an R2 of 0.18 and 0.19, respectively. The reduction in R2 from Panel A is primarily driven by
the positive correlation between firm size and debt face value D (larger firms have more debt).
This positive relation produces a negative correlation between size and the inverse of D, which is
sufficient to offset the positive correlation between price and size, thus the insignificant coefficient
11The reverse is not true: when the target is sold as a going-concern, we sometimes observe competing bids for
individual assets that lost out to the higher continuation bid.
12Each of the remaining variables is constrained to a single coefficient across the two auction outcomes.
13
on size.
The recovery rate regressions maintain the significantly negative effect of asset intangibility and
piecemeal liquidation. As in Panel A, we run separate regressions to test which variables in X1
have coefficients that are significantly different across the outcomes PL and GC. For the total
recovery rate, Profit and Specific pass this test and are entered with separate coefficients for the
two auction outcomes. There is now a significant impact of Profit, and this variable enters with
a positive sign in the subsample of going-concern sales and with a negative sign in the piecemeal
liquidation subsample. There is, however, no significant impact of asset specificity on the recovery
rate. Finally, there is some evidence that recovery rates are greater when contemporaneous industry
profitability is high, but with no impact from the business cycle change. In the remaining empirical
analysis, we use the first of the two regressions in Panel B as our model for the fundamental price
r∗.13
3.3 Residual regression tests
Recall that the dependent variable in the second step of the analysis is the standardized regression
residuals from Table 2. The second-step vector X2 of explanatory variables contains a constant
plus the following two categories of variables:
X2
 Industry liquidity : Ind Distress, Ind Leverage, No of firmsAuction outcome : GC, PL, Outsider, Buyout. (4)
Our primary industry liquidity variable is Ind Distress, which is based on bankruptcy filing fre-
quencies and interest coverage ratios of rival firms in the target industry at the time of the auction
(as defined in Table 1). Moreover, we complement this variable with Ind Leverage in order to
further capture adverse investment incentive effects of industry-wide debt overhang.
The third indicator of industry liquidity is No of firms. There are two potentially offsetting
effects on auction prices of this variable. First, the greater the number of firms in the target’s
industry, the greater the degree of potential competition in the auction, which tends to increase
13Our main conclusions are unaffected whether we use the first or the second regression model for r∗. Also, inclusion
of industry dummies in the regressions in Table 2 does not alter our conclusions below concerning the existence of
fire-sale discounts.
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auction prices. On the other hand, profit margins in highly competitive industries tend to be
smaller, which reduces bidder valuations. The net effect on auction prices is an empirical issue.
3.3.1 Going-concern sale versus piecemeal liquidation
Table 3 shows the results of the second-step residual regressions for the full sample of 258 auctions.
Although the overall explanatory power of the regressions is low, there are several interesting results.
First, the regressions yield statistically insignificant coefficients for the industry distress variables
Ind Distress and Ind Leverage in the overall sample (first regressions in Panels A and B). The
number of firms in the target industry receives a negative coefficient that is significant at the 6%
level. Thus, targets in larger industries tend to be associated with lower auction prices, possibly
because profit margins and asset values in highly competitive industries are relatively small.
Second, as in Step 1 above, we run separate regressions to test which variables in X2 have
coefficients that are significantly different across the auction outcomes PL and GC. Ind Distress
is the only variable to pass this test and is therefore entered with separate coefficients for the two
outcomes (Distress∗GC and Distress∗PL).14 Importantly, there is no evidence of a negative effect
of Ind Distress in the subsample of going-concern sales, whether we use auction price residuals or
recovery rate residuals as dependent variable.
Third, there is a statistically significant and negative interaction effect between industry distress
and piecemeal liquidations. The coefficient on Distress ∗ PL is approximately -1.9 in the auction
price regressions of Panel A, and -1.7 in the recovery rate regressions of Panel B. The p-values
for this coefficient are approximately 0.03 in Panel A and 0.05 in Panel B. In each regression, the
coefficient on Distress ∗ PL is also significantly different from the coefficient on Distress ∗ GC.
The negative and significant interaction effect between Distress and piecemeal liquidation persists
throughout the remaining tables with price and recovery regression specifications.
Fourth, the binary variable for the buyer being an industry outsider is not significant. If the
outside buyer is less efficient than an industry insider (as presumed in the model of Shleifer and
Vishny, 1992) the outsider may attempt to counter this inefficiency by rehiring a high-quality CEO.
This happens rarely in our sample, however. Of the 39 cases where the buyer is an industry outsider
14We include the dummy PL to allow the two interaction effects Distress∗GC and Distress∗PL to have different
intercept terms. As shown in the table, PL is insignificant here.
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and the new CEO could be identified, only four (10%) rehire the old CEO.15 The absence of fire-sale
discounts in outsider purchases, combined with the outsiders’ decision not to rehire the old CEO,
challenges the notion that industry outsiders are less efficient buyers than industry insiders.
The insignificance of the buyer’s industry affiliation for auction prices contradicts a conclusion of
Strömberg (2000) that sales to outsiders tend to have lower prices than sales to insiders (and which
he labels a fire-sale cost). However, while we are comparing prices paid by industry insiders and
outsiders in going-concern sales, Strömberg’s comparison mixes continuation sales and piecemeal
liquidations. In his analysis, sales to insiders are exclusively going-concern sales (40 cases), while
sales to outsiders are primarily piecemeal liquidations (60 of 86 cases). The lack of a going-concern
premium in piecemeal liquidations produces greater average prices in his group of insider sales
regardless of any liquidity constraints and fire-sale discounts. Table 3 shows that there is no price
impact of the industry affiliation of the buyer for continuation sales.
Fifth, average price residuals when the acquisition method is a buyout are indistinguishable from
price residuals in mergers. As discussed above, buyouts allow otherwise liquidity-constrained buyers
to finance the cash bid externally. Moreover, the buyout method overcomes the underinvestment
incentive resulting from debt overhang emphasized by Myers (1977). Absent liquidity constraints,
or if the buyout method is available to all bidders, competition between buyers is expected to drive
prices to the point where there is no impact of the acquisition method on final auction prices, which
is what we observe in Table 3. Combined with the finding that bidders use the buyout method in
the majority of the going-concern sales, we conclude that the buyout mechanism is important for
promoting auction liquidity.
We next test whether there is a differential price effect of distress in the subsamples of contin-
uation sales to industry insiders and outsiders, respectively.
3.3.2 Industry affiliation of buyer
The first two regressions in Panel A and in Panel B of Table 4 explore effects of buyer industry
affiliation. This is done by creating the interaction variables Distress ∗ Outsider and Distress ∗
Insider. Insider is defined as the complement to Outsider in continuation sales, so that Outsider+
Insider +PL = 1. Table 4 displays the results of estimating the following system of two equations
15In contrast, the old CEO is rehired in 82 (62%) of 133 insider sales where CEO retention could be identified.
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(shown here only with the variables interacting with industry distress):
p− p∗ =
 1β2Distress ∗Outsider + 1β3Distress ∗ Insider + 1β4Distress ∗ PL + ...2β1Distress + 2β3Distress ∗ Insider + 2β4Distress ∗ PL + ... . (5)
The first equation tests whether the industry distress coefficients are individually different from
zero for the three subsamples Outsider, Insider, and PL. The second equation provides a direct
test of whether the coefficients are also different from each other. Specifically, 2β3 6= 0 implies that
1β3 6= 1β2, and 2β4 6= 0 indicates that 1β4 6= 1β2.16
The regression results in Panel A show that the coefficients 1β2 and 1β3 are both statistically
insignificant, indicating that prices in sales to outsiders and insiders, respectively, do not depend
on industry distress. The coefficient 1β4 for Distress ∗ PL remains negative and significant (as in
Table 3), and significantly different from the distress coefficient 1β2 conditional on an outsider sale.
The conclusion is similar when using the recovery rate residual as dependent variable (Panel B).
Auction prices in going-concern sales are unaffected by industry distress, also when allowing for
different effects across buyer industry affiliation.17
In sum, the fire-sale hypothesis H1 is rejected for auctions leading to sale of the target as a going-
concern, a conclusion that contradicts Strömberg (2000). There is, however, evidence of conditional
fire-sale discounts in auctions that lead to piecemeal liquidations. Controlling for the lower average
fundamental value in a liquidation, price and recovery residuals in piecemeal liquidations are shown
to interact negatively with industry-wide distress: a 1% increase in Ind Distress is associated with
a 2% decrease in piecemeal liquidation prices. Conditional on our fundamental pricing model being
correct, this is evidence of a fire-sale discount. Overall, our finding of fire-sale discounts in piecemeal
liquidations is comparable to conclusions in the extant literature on distressed asset sales (Pulvino,
1998, 1999; Ramey and Shapiro, 2001).
16To see why, note that the second equation can be rewritten as
p− p∗ = 2β1Distress(Outsider + Insider + PL) + 2β3Distress ∗ Insider + 2β4Distress ∗ PL + ...
Comparing these coefficients with the coefficients of the first equation, it follows that 2β1 = 1β2, 2β3+ 2β1 = 1β3,
and 2β4+ 2β1 = 1β4.
17When performing tests analogous to those in Table 4 for the acquisition method, the coefficients on Distress ∗
Buyout and Distress ∗Merger are also insignificantly different from zero.
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3.4 The probability of a going-concern sale
The previous analysis indicates a significant price-impact of industry distress only when the auction
leads to piecemeal liquidation of the bankrupt firm. In Table 5, we examine determinants of the
probability that the target is purchased as a going concern versus liquidated piecemeal. The
explanatory variables Z in the model are the target asset characteristics and industry liquidity
conditions observable at the beginning of the auction. Panel A shows binomial logit estimates,
where the choice is between going-concern sale (N=200) and piecemeal liquidation (N=58). Panels
B and C provide trinomial estimates, where the choice is between two types of going-concern
transactions as well as piecemeal liquidation.
Let πn denote the probability of outcome n. With three outcomes, the multinomial logit model
is
πn = exp(γ′nZ)/
3∑
m=1
exp(γ′mZ), (6)
where γn is the vector of coefficients to be estimated for the n’th auction outcome. We are primarily
concerned with the derivative of the n’th probability with respect to the kth characteristic in the
vector Z, ∂πn/∂zk. With two outcomes only (binomial estimation), π1 = 1 − π2 and this partial
is simply given by the coefficient estimate γk in the vector γ. In the multinomial case, however, a
change in zk changes all probabilities simultaneously, so that
∂πn/∂zk = πn(γnk −
3∑
m=1
γmkπm), (7)
where γnk is the parameter for the kth explanatory variable in the vector γn.
Panel A provides the coefficient estimates γ and their p-values. The likelihood ratio test statistic
(LRT) indicates that the regression model is significant at the 6.5% level. None of the individual
coefficients are significant at the 5% level, while four coefficients are significant at the 10% level.
These four coefficients are for the variables Specific, Intangible, Bus Cycle, and Ind Leverage.
The probability of a going-concern sale is hence greater the more specific and intangible the target
assets. This makes intuitive sense as firm-specific rents tend to be greater for such asset charac-
teristics and a piecemeal liquidation eradicates going-concern rents. Thus, bidders are more likely
to submit continuation bids when the loss in value from a piecemeal liquidation is relatively high.
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Moreover, the probability of the auction resulting in a going-concern sale increases with the recent
uptick in the business cycle.
Interestingly, while the industry distress variable played an important role in the above price-
residual regressions for piecemeal liquidation, this variable does not affect the decision to liquidate.
The coefficient on Ind Distress is 1.99 with a p-value of only 0.10. Piecemeal liquidation is, how-
ever, significantly more likely when industry leverage is high. The coefficient on Ind Leverage is
-4.45 with a p-value of 0.05. Industry distress and industry leverage are, of course, correlated: the
Pearson correlation coefficient between these two variables is a significant 0.29. Thus, according
to Panel A, the odds in favor of continuing the target as a going concern (relative to piecemeal
liquidation) are lower when the auction takes place during industry-wide distress. Together with
the earlier price-residual results, the evidence indicates that industry-wide distress simultaneously
increases the odds of a piecemeal liquidation and reduces piecemeal liquidation prices. It is pos-
sible that industry-wide economic (not just financial) distress accelerates industry exit and lowers
liquidation sales prices.
In the model framework of Shleifer and Vishny (1992), fire-sale prices are the result of relatively
inefficient industry outsiders winning the auction for the target. We have already shown that
auction prices in going-concern sales are statistically independent of the industry association of
the buyer. Panel B of Table 5 further shows that the probability that an industry outsider wins
the target in a going-concern bid (N=53) is unaffected by the distress variables Ind Distress
and Ind Leverage. In contrast, several of the coefficients for the buyer being an industry insider
(N=147) are significant: buyers are more likely to be an insider when the target assets are relatively
intangible, and in periods of business cycle upturns. In terms of industry distress, however, the
evidence is mixed. The probability that the buyer is an insider is increasing in Ind Distress and
falling in Ind Leverage. While the net impact of industry distress is ambiguous, it does appear
that industry insiders are willing to bid during industry distress provided that there has also been
a recent uptick in the business cycle.18
Finally, Panel C separates going-concern sales via merger (N=42) versus buyout (N=104). This
regression is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.03. Buyers are more likely to select the
18The results of Panel B should be interpreted with caution, however, as the regression χ2 statistic has a p-value
of only 0.15.
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buyout method the greater the target asset size, the more specific and intangible the target assets,
and during a business cycle increase. The choice of the buyout mechanism is, however, statistically
unrelated to industry distress variables. Ind Distress is a predictor of the piecemeal liquidation
outcome (p-value of 0.07) but not of the acquisition method in going-concern sales.
3.5 Robustness tests
Recall that the two-step approach fixes the estimated coefficients β̂1 on the fundamental asset
quality variables in X1 in the second-step regression. As a result, the estimated coefficients β̂2
on the fire-sales variables in X2 measure the marginal impact of industry illiquidity on auction
prices and recovery rates. To examine the impact on β̂2 of relaxing this constraint, we estimate the
following single-step regression:
p = β′1pX1 + β
′
2pX2 + εp
r = β′1rX1 + β
′
2rX2 + εr, (8)
where the error terms are again assumed iid with mean zero, and the coefficients are estimated
using OLS. The explanatory variables are the fundamental asset characteristics X1 from Table 2,
and the industry liquidity conditions X2 from Table 3 (without the piecemeal liquidation indicator
PL in X2). The coefficient estimates for the auction price (p) are shown in the first row of Panel
A in Table 6, while the estimates for the recovery rate (r) are in the first row of Panel B. The
key result, that auction prices are affected by industry distress in piecemeal liquidations but not in
going-concern sales, is robust to this single-equation specification.
Next, recall from Table 5 that bidders use target asset characteristics such as Specific and
Intangible (in addition to various unobservable characteristics) in the selection of a going-concern
sale over piecemeal liquidation. Moreover, the explanatory variable X1 in our fundamental pricing
model includes the indicator PL for the auction outcome, which is endogenous. This raises the
possibility that the OLS estimation of the pricing model yields biased coefficients due to self-
selection (Heckman, 1979; Maddala, 1983; Li and Prabhala, 2007).
To deal with this issue, let γ′Z be the bidder’s choice model, where a going-concern bid (gc) is
selected over a piecemeal liquidation (pl) if γ′Z ≥ η, and where η is a mean zero error term with
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V ar(η) = 1. The bidder switches between two pricing regressions:
pgc = β′X + εgc iff γ′Z ≥ η
ppl = β′X + εpl iff γ′Z < η, (9)
where X = X1+X2 and η is correlated with εgc and εpl. Due to this correlation, E(εgc|η ≤ γ′Z) 6= 0
and E(εpl|η > γ′Z) 6= 0.
The standard procedure to yield unbiased estimates is to include the inverse Mills ratio based on
the choice model γ′Z as an additional explanatory variable in the pricing model regression. We use
as our selection model the variables Z as listed in Panel A of Table 5, and where the coefficients γ are
estimated using probit. Define the inverse Mills ratio λ such that λ = φ/Φ if the auction outcome
is a going-concern sale and λ = −φ/(1−Φ) if piecemeal liquidation, where φ(γ′Z) and Φ(γ′Z) are
the standard normal density- and cumulative distribution functions, respectively, evaluated at the
predicted value γ̂′Z. If the coefficient on λ is statistically significant, OLS-estimations are biased.
The regression results are shown in the second row of both Panels A and B in Table 6. These two
regressions are estimated using weighted least squares (WLS) to correct for heteroskedasticity, and
include the correction term λ for self-selection. The WLS estimate for λ is statistically insignificant
in both regressions. This means that correcting for self-selection of the auction outcome is not
required and that the OLS estimates are unbiased with respect to the going-concern choice. Thus,
we maintain our earlier conclusions of a conditional fire-sale effect in piecemeal liquidations but not
in going-concern sales.
4 Auction prepacks and liquidation preemption
In theory, pervasive bidder illiquidity may eliminate the prospect of any going-concern bids in
the auction, and cause excessive or inefficient liquidation of financially distressed but economically
viable firms. As mentioned in the introduction, a major motivation behind the introduction of
Chapter 11 was to reduce the risk of this happening relative to an auction-based system. Direct
tests for the presence of excessive liquidation are difficult if not impossible to design. Below, we
examine this issue from the opposite angle: is there evidence that key parties to the bankrupt firm
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work to preempt excessive liquidation?
The idea pursued below is that auction prepacks anticipate and therefore preempt some liqui-
dations. Prepacks are private workouts prior to filing, so they naturally respond to anticipations
of excessive liquidation. Prepacks are also important in the auction system, as they constitute ap-
proximately one-quarter of our continuation sales. We first propose and test a price implication of
the liquidation preemption hypothesis. We then present measures of post-bankruptcy performance
in prepacks versus other going-concern sales as further evidence on the likelihood of liquidation
preemption.
4.1 The liquidation preemption hypothesis
If market conditions create expectations of excessive liquidation in the bankruptcy auction, the
bank lender may take action to prevent it. Once the firm has filed for bankruptcy, the auction
eliminates the bank’s bargaining power, and severe auction illiquidity may produce a price close to
or at the piecemeal liquidation value. Anticipating this, it may be in the bank’s best interest to
initiate a voluntary workout involving sale of the target firm’s operations followed by a prepackaged
bankruptcy filing. Our predictions for auction prepacks are as follows:
H2 (Liquidation preemption hypothesis): A creditor anticipating inefficient liqui-
dation due to auction illiquidity has an incentive to work out a continuation sale prior
to bankruptcy filing—an auction prepack. Auction prepacks designed to preempt liqui-
dation have prices that are higher than the piecemeal liquidation value but lower than
prices in regular going-concern auctions. Prepacks are more likely to occur the more
specific and intangible the target assets.
Under H2, the prepack prevents a loss of the firm’s going-concern value implied by inefficient
piecemeal liquidation. Because some going-concern value is retained, the buyer accepts paying
a price exceeding the expected piecemeal liquidation value in the auction. Moreover, because a
prepack tends to occur in response to the threat of liquidation, the bidder’s bargaining power is
greater than normal, so average prepack prices are lower than in regular auction going-concern
sales. As to the second part of H2, target asset specificity and intangibility generate rents that
will be dissipated in a piecemeal liquidation. Given a high risk of liquidation and the greater the
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expected loss of rents, the more likely we are to observe a prepack. We next turn to empirical tests
of these predictions.
4.2 Price and recovery residuals in prepacks
Table 7 shows coefficient estimates in price- and recovery residual regressions for auction prepacks
and salebacks. We single out salebacks along with prepacks because liquidation destroys private
benefits of control, which in turn may prompt target insiders to support liquidation preemption
(Strömberg, 2000). Notice first that the coefficient on Distress ∗ PL is negative and significant as
before. The first regression in Panel A includes an indicator for prepack. It enters with a signif-
icantly negative coefficient of -0.52 (p-value of 0.00), suggesting lower prices in prepack sales. In
separate regressions (not shown here), we include a dummy for non-prepack going-concern sales in
our fundamental pricing regression (Table 2). This dummy receives a significantly positive coeffi-
cient, while the coefficient for PL is still negative and significant. This means that average prices
in prepacks are lower than in other going-concern sales but higher than in piecemeal liquidations,
as predicted by our liquidation preemption hypothesis.
The second regression in Table 7 adds the indicator variable Saleback, which is insignificant. In
the third regression, we replace the indicators for prepack and saleback with indicators for the non-
overlapping subsamples Prepack ∗Saleback, Prepack ∗Nonsaleback, and Nonprepack ∗Saleback.
The average price-residual in the subsample of prepack-salebacks is strong and negative, with
a coefficient value of -0.73 and a p-value of 0.00. The subsample of prepack-nonsalebacks also
shows a negative coefficient, significant at the 5% level. The average price-residual is, however,
insignificantly different from zero for salebacks that take place in the regular auction: the coefficient
for Nonprepack∗Saleback is -0.17 with a p-value of 0.30. In sum, prepacks produce negative price-
residuals on average, and more so when the prepack is also a saleback. Salebacks, however, have
no significant price-residuals when occurring in the regular auction. It is the private workout that
matters, not the saleback transaction in and of itself.19
Turning to debt recovery rates, in Panel B of Table 7, none of the coefficients involving prepacks
or salebacks are significant. Thus, while prepacks on average produce lower prices, this category
19We also examine the effect of industry distress in the subsamples of prepacks and salebacks, using the structure
of Eq. (5). The results show that the price-residuals in prepacks, salebacks, non-prepacks, and non-salebacks do not
interact with Ind Distress.
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does not affect total debt recovery rates. This is as expected if the bank promotes the prepack
mechanism over piecemeal liquidation only when it is advantageous to do so. Consistent with
this self-selection argument, rerunning the regressions in Panel B with the bank’s own recovery
rate (instead of the total debt recovery rate) yields results that are indistinguishable from those
reported in Panel B (available upon request). That is, the bank’s recovery in prepacks is statistically
similar to that of non-prepack continuation sales.
4.3 Prepack and saleback probabilities
We next examine the determinants of the prepack and saleback decisions. Hypothesis H2 further
predicts that prepacks are more likely to occur the more specific and intangible the target assets.
Table 8 reports the total derivative with respect to each regression variable (as in Table 5). Consis-
tent with H2, Panel A shows that the prepack probability increases with firm size, asset specificity,
and asset intangibility. Notice also that there is no effect of industry liquidity conditions on the
prepack probability. This suggests that fundamental target asset characteristics—not industry
conditions per se—drive the basic prepack decision.
Target liquidation eliminates private benefits, if any, of target insiders. While a value-maximizing
creditor has an incentive to preempt inefficient liquidation, target insiders may be willing to pay to
continue the target as a going-concern even when liquidation is efficient—up to the value of the pri-
vate benefits. This is consistent with our observation that salebacks occur in both regular auctions
and prepacks. We expect the probability of a saleback to have some of the same determinants as
the prepack probability. This is confirmed by the multinomial logit estimates in Panel B of Table
8. As for prepacks, the saleback probability increases with target asset specificity and intangibility.
In addition, there is a positive impact on the saleback probability from the recent change in the
business cycle.
The greatest impact on the saleback probability comes from the two industry distress indicators.
Ind Distress has a large and positive coefficient, a result also shown by Strömberg (2000). However,
this coefficient is to a large extent countered by a negative impact of Ind Leverage. The net effect
is difficult to interpret. As argued by Strömberg (2000), it is possible that salebacks are designed
to avoid auction illiquidity during industry-wide distress (thus the positive effect of Ind Distress).
On the other hand, the negative and offsetting effect of Ind Leverage may suggest that the target
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owner’s incentive to invest is severely attenuated in periods with substantial industry debt overhang.
5 Post-bankruptcy performance
To the extent that auction prepacks are attempts to avoid piecemeal liquidation, successful restruc-
turing of the target may be relatively difficult. If so, we would expect to see poorer post-bankruptcy
performance for targets in such transactions. Similarly, if industry outsiders bring fewer managerial
skills to the table than do industry insiders (as presumed under the fire-sale hypothesis), then the
inferior managerial quality may also result in sub-par post-bankruptcy performance.20
Eckbo and Thorburn (2003) conclude that firms restructured under Swedish bankruptcy auc-
tions overall have a post-bankruptcy operating performance at par with that of non-bankrupt
industry rivals. Because the sample firms are all private, they use operating profitability and
bankruptcy refiling rates to indicate the economic viability of the firms’ operations. Here, we use
the same performance metrics but focus on the performance of our subsamples of auction prepacks
and sales to industry outsiders.
Post-bankruptcy performance estimation requires the identity of the newly restructured firm.
We have this information in the first year after bankruptcy (“year 1”) for a total of 150 of our targets
sold as going-concern, which is the sample we use to compute cumulative refiling probabilities.
Within this subsample, post-bankruptcy financial statements are available for a total of 106 firms
in year 1. Table 9 reports annual industry-adjusted operating profitability (EBITDA/sales) in
Panel A, book value of total debt to total assets in Panel B, and cumulative bankruptcy refiling
probabilities (Panel C) for four years following the bankruptcy auction. Panels A and B report
the median industry-adjusted value, computed as the difference between the firm and its median
industry rival, where a rival is a firm with at least 20 employees in the same four-digit SIC industry
as the target.
Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the median industry-adjusted operating profitability is sta-
tistically indistinguishable from zero for the first three years following bankruptcy. Moreover, the
p-values for the difference between prepacks and non-prepacks, and outsiders versus insiders, are
20Studies of Chapter 11 show that post-bankruptcy operating cash flows tend to be below industry standards,
suggesting inefficient restructurings (Hotchkiss, 1995; Alderson and Betker, 1995; Chang and Schoar, 2007). One
reason for the apparent inefficiency may be inferior quality of managers retained through the Chapter 11 process.
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all high. We conclude that the post-bankruptcy operating performance of auctioned targets is in-
distinguishable from the corresponding performance of industry rivals, and that it is unaffected by
whether the filing is a prepack or whether the buyer is an industry outsider.
Panel B shows that targets in prepacks as well as non-prepacks have post-bankruptcy leverage
ratios that are significantly higher than that of industry peers in years 1 and 2. There is no
difference in the use of leverage in prepacks versus non-prepack acquisitions, however. Targets that
are acquired by industry insiders (but not outsiders) have significantly higher leverage ratios than
rivals in all four years shown in the table. Moreover, inside buyers show a greater reliance on
leverage than outside buyers in years 3 and 4 (with p-values for the difference in those years of 0.03
and 0.00, respectively).
Panel C shows the difference between the bankruptcy refiling rates of our auctioned targets and
the industry-weighted bankruptcy filing rate. Interestingly, targets in prepacks have a significantly
greater industry-adjusted refiling probability than targets in non-prepack going-concern sales. By
year 4, the cumulative industry-adjusted refiling rate is 35% for prepacks compared to 8% for non-
prepack targets. In contrast, targets where the buyer in the auction was an industry outsider on
average refile for bankruptcy at a rate that is statistically indistinguishable from the refiling rate
of targets purchased by industry insiders (4% versus 18% by year 4, with a p-value of 0.24 for the
difference).
Intrigued by the relatively low average refiling rate when the buyer is an industry outsider, we
estimate the probability of bankruptcy refiling within two years of the auction. Table 10 shows
the coefficient estimates in the logit-regressions. In the first regression, the refiling probability is
shown to increase with asset specificity, but is independent of the target size and asset tangibility
at the time of the auction. Moreover, targets that are auctioned during a business cycle upturn
are less likely to refile. The two industry distress variables, Ind Distress and Ind Leverage, have
significant but opposite effects, with industry distress lowering the probability and industry leverage
increasing the probability. Our fire-sale discount estimate has no impact on the refiling probability:
the coefficient on the price residual p− p∗ is statistically insignificant. A consistent interpretation
is that the fire-sale discount is economically unimportant (as concluded above), or that a fire-sale
discount, if present, does not affect the quality of the restructuring of the target.
In the second regression of Table 10, we have added the binary variables Prepack and Outsider.
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Being a prepack target significantly increases the refiling probability, while a target acquired by an
industry outsider has a significantly lower probability of refiling within two years of the auction.
Both results are interesting. Consistent with our liquidation preemption hypothesis H2, prepacks
appear to be more risky than non-prepacks in terms of the chance of having to refile within several
years after the auction. This makes intuitive sense if “rescuing” a target from inefficient liquidation
involves a relatively complex restructuring. As to the lower refiling probability for industry out-
siders, it could reflect a selection of less risky targets or the presumption that industry outsiders are
less efficient buyers may be wrong. The latter interpretation is consistent with the evidence above
that outsiders pay no lower auction prices than do insiders, and they show no lower post-bankruptcy
operating performance.
6 Conclusions
Proponents of a renegotiation-based bankruptcy system such as Chapter 11 argue that the alterna-
tive auction mechanism carries an unacceptable risk of fire-sale and excessive liquidation. Sweden’s
system of automatic bankruptcy auctions represents an interesting setting for testing this argument
as there are no effective provisions for renegotiations under court supervision. The auctions are
mandatory for all filing firms, standardized in form, and the seller has little or no influence over
the outcome. The bids alone determine whether the firm will be continued as a going concern or
liquidated piecemeal. A creditor concerned with auction illiquidity leading to excessive liquidation
must take preventative measures by means of a private workout (before filing). Private workouts
are target acquisition agreements that are submitted along with the bankruptcy filing (prepack
auction).
We study prices, debt recovery rates, acquisition mechanisms, and post-bankruptcy performance
across the entire range of auction outcomes in this system. The bankrupt firms are all private and
with an average pre-filing asset size close to the average size of private firms filing for Chapter 11.
We specify a fundamental pricing model based on target asset characteristics and test whether final
auction prices deviate from fundamentals during periods of severe industry distress. Conditional
on the fundamentals, significantly lower auction prices during periods of industry-wide illiquidity
are considered evidence of fire-sale discounts. Thus, our tests of fire-sale discounts are joint tests
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of the fundamental pricing model and the hypothesized pricing effects of temporary demand-side
illiquidity.
A key—and perhaps surprising—finding is that fire-sale discounts exist only when the auction
leads to piecemeal liquidation of the target (the outcome in one-fifth of our sample auctions).
Prices in going-concern sales are unaffected by measures of industry-wide illiquidity and distress.
For piecemeal liquidations, however, higher industry-wide financial distress lowers both prices and
debt recovery rates. This result is robust to endogenous selection of the auction outcome by bidders
in the auction. Moreover, our finding of a fire-sale discount for piecemeal liquidations is comparable
to studies of voluntary asset sales by U.S. companies both in and out of bankruptcy.
It appears that auctions where the buyer continues the target as a going concern are sufficiently
competitive to yield prices that are indistinguishable from fundamentals. In going-concern sales,
there are typically multiple bids, and there is no evidence that prices or recovery rates interact
with measures of industry-wide distress, or with the industry-affiliation of the buyer (outsider
versus insider)—two central indicators of fire-sale conditions used in the extant literature. We
further show that bidders make frequent use of a leveraged buyout acquisition method which
likely increases competition. Buyouts relax liquidity constraints and reduce bidder underinvestment
incentives in the presence of industry-wide debt overhang. Possibly as a result, buyout prices are
indistinguishable from prices in mergers, the alternative acquisition method.
We also argue that auction prepacks play an important role as a mechanism to preempt excessive
liquidation when the auction is expected to be illiquid. There is substantial evidence to support
this proposition. Prepack prices are somewhat higher than in piecemeal liquidations but lower
than in regular, in-auction going-concern sales. The industry-adjusted post-bankruptcy operating
performance of prepacks is on average similar to non-prepack going-concern sales. However, prepack
targets have a significantly greater probability of refiling for bankruptcy after the auction. Thus,
liquidation preemption appears to be a relatively risky strategy. Overall, as prepacks constitute
one-quarter of our going-concern sample, the automatic auction mechanism produces substantial
activity to avoid excessive liquidation.
We have shown in this paper that the Swedish automatic auction bankruptcy system works
particularly well when the bankrupt firm is purchased as a going concern. There is no systematic
evidence of fire-sales nor excessive liquidation. An interesting issue for future research is whether
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automatic auctions would also work well in the context of U.S. bankruptcies. It is possible that
mandatory auctions are particularly well suited for the unique legal and corporate governance
tradition in Sweden. On the other hand, as mentioned in the introduction, U.S. capital markets have
moved in the direction of what Baird and Rasmussen (2003) characterize as “auction mechanisms in
one form or another” for large bankruptcies also. This trend is likely to continue if auctions are in
fact able to resolve the often complex corporate capital structures observed in the U.S.—something
that the Swedish experience does not address.
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Strömberg, Per, 2000, Conflicts of interests and market illiquidity in bankruptcy auctions: Theory
and tests, Journal of Finance 55, 2641–2692.
, and Karin S. Thorburn, 1996, An empirical investigation of Swedish corporations in
liquidation bankruptcy, EFI Research Report, Stockholm School of Economics.
Thorburn, Karin S., 2000, Bankruptcy auctions: Costs, debt recovery, and firm survival, Journal
of Financial Economics 58, 337–368.
Williamson, Oliver E., 1988, Corporate finance and corporate governance, Journal of Finance 43,
567–592.
32
Figure 1
Frequency distributions of the number of interested bidders and actual bids in
automatic bankruptcy auctions.
The average number of interested and actual bidders are 5.5 and 3.5, respectively. Sample of Swedish firms filing for
bankruptcy, 1988-1991, and sold as going-concerns in the bankruptcy auction (excluding auction prepacks).
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Table 1
Sample characteristics and variable definitions for automatic bankruptcy auctions
The sample contains 258 auctions from January 1988 to December 1991. “GC” and “PL” indicate going-concern
sale and piecemeal liquidation, respectively. Financial information and book values are either “at filing” (from the
bankruptcy case file), or “last reported” (from the most recent financial statement prior to bankruptcy filing, dated
on average 16 months earlier). The target industry is defined using the four-digit SIC industry code of the target,
and requires a firm to have at least 20 employees. All industry information is for the year of the bankruptcy filing.
All GC PL
Variable Definition Mean Mean Mean
N Sample size 258 200 58
A. Target asset characteristics
Size Log(book value of assets), last reporteda 2.30 2.33 2.23
Asset sales Indicator for asset sales within two years prior to filing, trustee’s file 0.26 0.28 0.19
Profit Operating profitability: EBITDA/sales, last reported -0.00 0.00 -0.02
Specific Book value of (machinery and equipment)/(total assets), last reported 0.15 0.16 0.12
Intangible Fraction intangible assets: (unsecured debt)/(total debt), at filing 0.61 0.62 0.58
B. Industry liquidity conditions
Ind Profit Median industry firm operating profitability: EBITDA/sales 0.05 0.05 0.05
Bus Cycle Change in a quarterly, composite business cycle indexb -0.48 -0.33 -0.93
Ind Distress Fraction of industry firms reporting an interest coverage ratio < 1
or file for bankruptcy the following yearc 0.34 0.34 0.32
Ind Leverage Median industry firm leverage: book value of debt/assets 0.78 0.78 0.80
No of firms Number of firms in the industry 267 268 262
C. Auction outcomes
PL Indicator for piecemeal liquidation of the target 0.22
GC Indicator for going-concern sales 0.78
Outsider Indicator for going-concern buyer being a target industry outsider.d 0.26
Buyout Indicator for going-concern buyer using the buyout method (vs. merger) 0.71e
Prepack Indicator for going-concern buyer agreeing to acquire target pre-filing 0.21 0.27
Saleback Indicator for going-concern buyer being a former target owner 0.63f
Recovery Debt recovery rate: (net auction revenue)/(total face value of debt)g 0.35 0.37 0.26
aFor illustration, the numbers reported in this row are in US dollars million (not the logarithm).
bThe change is from the quarter prior to the quarter of the bankruptcy filing. The index is composed of the gross
national product (+), producer price index (+), aggregate consumption (+), unemployment rate (-) and number of
corporate bankruptcy filings (-). The variables are normalized with their respective mean and standard deviation
before entering the index with equal weight and the sign indicated in parenthesis.
cInterest coverage ratio = (EBITDA+interest income)/(interest expense).
dWe define insider sales as cases where the buyer (i) has the same three-digit SIC code as the sample firm; (ii) is
identified as a competitor of the sample firm; or (iii) is a former owner or employee of the bankrupt firm
eThe Buyout variable is identified for a total of 146 continuation sales, so 71% is 104/146.
fThe Saleback variable is identified for a total of 193 continuation sales, so 63% is 122/193.
gNet auction revenue is the total proceeds from bankruptcy minus cost of the trustee’s services.
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Table 9
Industry-adjusted post-bankruptcy operating performance and cumulative
bankruptcy refiling rates for targets sold as going-concern, classified by filing method
(prepack vs. non-prepack) and buyer industry affiliation (outsider vs. insider)
The table reports operating margin, debt ratios and cumlative refiling rates for bankrupt firms auctioned as going
concerns. “Industry-adjusted” is the difference between the target firm’s value and the corresponding median
value in the target’s four-digit SIC industry code. “Year 1” is the first calendar year after auction bankruptcy,
etc. Superscript ** (*) indicates that the sample median is different from the industry median at the 1% (5%)
level, using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test. The p-value for the difference in industry-adjusted medians is from a
2-sided Mann-Whitney U-test and for the difference in cumulative refiling rates a 2-sided t-test. Variable definitions
are in Table 1. Sample of 150 Swedish firms filing for auction bankruptcy and sold as going-concern during 1988-1991.
Year after bankruptcy: 1 2 3 4
A: Industry-adjusted operating margin (EBITDA/sales)
Prepack Median 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00
n 23 20 15 12
Non-prepack Median -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.02∗∗
n 83 74 58 44
p-value of difference: prepack vs. non-prepack (0.138) (0.416) (0.069) (0.140)
Outsider Median 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.05
n 29 26 19 11
Insider Median -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.02∗
n 77 68 54 45
p-value of difference: outsider vs. insider (0.918) (0.906) (0.841) (0.657)
B: Industry-adjusted debt ratio (book value of debt/total assets)
Prepack Median 0.16∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.13 0.07
n 23 21 15 12
Non-prepack Median 0.11∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.05
n 83 75 60 45
p-value of difference: prepack vs. non-prepack (0.797) (0.364) (0.474) (0.625)
Outsider Median 0.10 0.04 -0.02 -0.16
n 29 27 20 12
Insider Median 0.12∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.07∗∗
n 77 69 55 45
p-value of difference: outsider vs. insider (0.280) (0.119) (0.033) (0.004)
C: Industry-adjusted cumulative bankruptcy refiling rate
Prepack n=39 0.17 0.33 0.34 0.35
Non-prepack n=111 -0.01 0.08 0.10 0.08
p-value of difference: prepack v. non-prepack (0.014) (0.010) (0.017) (0.023)
Outsider n=36 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.04
Insider n=114 0.04 0.17 0.18 0.18
p-value of difference: outsider vs. insider (0.862) (0.230) (0.230) (0.236)
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